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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim by appellant for payment of 
group health and accident benefits and life insurance denied to 
appellant by his employer Wycoff Company and Lafayette Life 
Insurance Company. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court granted summary judgments in favor 
of respondents dismissing appellant's complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seeks affirmation of the summary judgments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wycoff Company employed Stanley L. Larson from approxi-
mately March 20, 1977 until May, 1979. Mr. Larson commenced 
working for Wycoff on a part-time basis on the dock. In May, 
1977, he transferred from part-time to full-time employment and 
remained full-time until September, 1978, when he transferred to 
the diesel shop as a part-time employee. Mr. Larson desired to 
return to school and the part-time employment was made at his 
discretion. 
Wycoff provides for its full-time employees two 
insurance programs. One is a health and accident insurance, 
which is self-funded by Wycoff, and the other is a life 
insurance program, which is covered by a group policy issued by 
Lafayette Life Insurance Company. Galbraith & Green, Inc., a 
Utah corporation, is the administrator of the health and acci-
dent program for Wycoff, and upon receipt of monthly computer 
-2-
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lists of eligible employees from Wycoff, forwards the same to 
Lafayette Life Insurance Company for its records. 
At the time Mr. Larson became a full-time employee, he 
was provided with a "red book" which Wycoff provides to all of 
its full-time employees and in which, among other things, are 
described the benefits available to employees and defines those 
who are eligible. After being a full-time employee for thirty 
days, Mr. Larson completed the necessary application forms in 
order for he and his dependents to be insured under the health 
and accident and group life insurance policies offered in the 
"red book" as employee benefits. Mr. Larson admits that, prior 
to the time he transferred to the diesel shop, he was putting in 
40 hours a week. After he transferred to the diesel shop, he 
was putting in 25 to 30 hours a week. Mr. Larson had read the 
"red book," not once but on a number of occasions, and there is 
no doubt that he understood the language contained therein 
regarding the employee benefits and the eligibility require-
ments, together with all of the other various rules and 
regulations of the employer. 
It is Mr. Larson's claim that when he transferred from 
full-time to part-time employment, he received oral assurances 
from at least one supervisor that he would remain covered under 
the "benefits" offered by Wycoff. Subsequent to his becoming a 
part-time employee, Wycoff, through its administrator, Galbraith 
& Green, Inc., paid Mr. Larson some medical expenses for his 
minor son which, under the program, would not have been payable 
-3-
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because of his becoming an ineligible employee when becoming 
part-time. Wycoff Company has chosen not to seek reimbursement 
of those funds from Mr Larson, although it is Wycoff's position 
that it could do so. 
The medical expenses which are the subject matter of 
this action, were incurred primarily for treatment of appel-
lant's 20-month old son, Joshua, who had incurred an illness 
which resulted in his death on January 7, 1979. Under the group 
life policy, appellant, if eligible, would be entitled to 
$2,000.00 in dependent life insurance proceeds. 
This action has been brought by Mr. Larson to recover 
the medical expenses incurred after he was no longer covered by 
reason of becoming a part-time employee, and to recover the 
group life insurance benefits under the policy with Lafayette 
Life Insurance Company. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF KNEW OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT HE BE A 
FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE HEALTH 
AND ACCIDENT BENEFITS. 
In the plaintiff's deposition taken September 16, 1979, 
by the undersigned, the following questions and answers appear 
on pages 11 and 12 regarding the delivery to him of the "red 
book" and his examination thereof: 
-4-
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Q. May of '77 you were delivered what they 
called a red book? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, that redbook had within it a description 
of the health and life insurance program--
A. Yes. 
Q. --is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it had within it information about when 
you were eligible and when you weren't eligible; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, it did. 
Q. Did it have in there a page that told you 
that full-time employees were eligible? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me show you a copy of a page out of the 
document--at least, I believe it to be--and ask 
you if you recognize that as being page 1 under 
"Definitions" (handing). 
(Witness examines.) 
A. This appears to be that same page. 
Mr. Moffat: Let's mark that. 
(Wycoff Exhibit A was marked for identification.) 
You will note that the Exhibit was marked as Exhibit A 
to the Larson deposition and sets forth, inter alia, the eligi-
bility requirements for participation in the insurance program. 
One of those requirements is that the employee be full-time for 
thirty days before becoming eligible. Later, in that same depo-
sition, at pages 18 and 19, Mr. Larson was asked the following 
questions and responded as set forth: 
-5-
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Q. Let me show you a copy of page of--I believe 
it came out of the red book--and ask you if you 
recognize that (handing). 
(Witness examines.) 
A. Okay. This looks like to be the same one 
that's in that book. 
(Wycoff Exhibit B was marked for identification.) 
Q. And it's correct, is it not, Mr. Larson, that 
that document in the first paragraph reads: 
"Employees: All active full-time employees 
may be included in the company's group 
benefit plan the first of the month fol-
lowing completion of 30 days of service, 
provided they complete an enrollment card, 
as required by the personnel office, and 
they are working as full-time employees 40 
hours or more per week." 
A. That's what it says. 
Q. And you think that's the same as was in the 
red book you had? 
A. I think it's the same. 
That document is attached as Exhibit B to the Larson 
deposition. On pages 20 and 21, Mr. Larson was asked the 
following questions, to which he responded as follows: 
Mr. Larson, while we've been off the record your 
counsel has furnished us with copies of pages 33 
and 36 of what you have identified as being in 
the red book. Do you recognize those pages as 
having been in your red book? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you read through the red book? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On more than one occasion? 
-6-
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A. I looked through it from time to time. 
Q. And you're familiar with the provision on the 
top of page 36 that reads--I'll let you look at 
it while I read it from my copy. This is the 
third paragraph. 
"All regular, full-time employees who have 
worked for the company for a period of not 
less than 30 days are eligible to apply for 
the group insurance grogram." You were 
familiar with that provision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In fact, you had applied, had you not, to 
become eligible when you went full-time? 
A. Well, I would have, but I was helped a great 
deal by the supervisor, Mel. 
Q. I understand that. But you did have to sign 
a card of some kind in order to become qualified? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall doing that? 
A. I believe I did. 
It is perfectly apparent from reading the foregoing 
excerpts from the Larson deposition that Mr. Larson not only 
knew of the privilege of enrolling in the insurance programs 
after becoming a full-time employee for 30 days, but, further, 
that in fact he did enroll and fill out the necessary applica-
tion forms and submit them to the company in order to obtain 
coverage. 
-7-
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POINT II 
IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH ALL OF THE ABOVE-CITED 
PORTIONS OF HIS DEPOSITION, THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS 
TO HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT HE COULD CONTINUE WITH HIS 
EMPLOYEE INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
In spite of all of the language quoted from plaintiff' 
own deposition, as set forth above, he, nevertheless, claims 
that two supervisors advised him that he could continue with hi 
benefits if he transferred to the diesel shop, even though he 
was going part-time. The following language commences on page 
13 of the plaintiff's deposition. This is a conversation 
alleged by the plaintiff between himself and an individual name< 
Floyd Rowley, who is a supervisor over the line driver portion 
of Wycoff Company: 
Q. When did you have a discussion with him? 
A. When I--I had talked to him sometime previous 
about transferring to the diesel shop; and he 
hemhawed around and said, "We'll get to it, we'll 
get to it." And it finally got down to where the 
other supervisor, this Jay Williams, out in the 
shop, was putting it to me? "Either you get this 
transfer through or something, or we'll have to 
find somebody else." We need an employee out 
here for the shop. So let's get it done." 
So I went to Floyd, and I said, "If you don't get 
this transfer in, I'll have to quit." I talked 
to Jay about it. "I'll quit Wycoff, the driver 
part of it, and start working for Wycoff in the 
diesel shop." 
Now, Floyd told me that that was a dumb thing to 
do, because if I did I would lose all of my 
benefits and that I should wait and be trans-
ferred out there so that I could retain my 
benefits. 
-8-
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Q. Did he define what benefits·he was talking 
about? 
A. I understood that it would be all benefits. 
he didn't limit it and say, "You'll get this, and 
you'll get that." 
Q. He just said "benefits"? 
A. He said "all benefits." 
Q. Did he at that time know that you were going 
out there on less than a 40-hour work week? 
A. As far as I know, he did. 
Q. Had you discussed it with him? 
A. I had discussed it with him and Jeff that the 
reason--one of the reasons that I was moving out 
there is because I would be going back to school. 
Another conversation allegedly had between Floyd Rowley 
and the plaintiff, or Jay Williams and the plaintiff, commencing 
on page 15 in his deposition is as follows: 
Q. And that was when you had the conversations 
you described with Floyd Rowley about you should 
transfer to retain your benefits? 
A. Right. 
Q. Did you have any conversations with him or 
anybody else specifically about your insurance? 
A. Well, I told Jay what Floyd had said, and he 
said he didn't know about it, but he'd check on 
it. 
Q. Who is Jay? 
A. Jay Williams. He's the shop foreman. 
Q. When did you tell him that? 
A. Oh, on or about the same day. 
Q. Is that the day you transferred or--
-9-
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A. No, it was a couple of days before. 
Q. Now, what did you tell him specifically? 
A. Jay? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I told him what Floyd had told me. 
Q. And that was--
A. That I should wait in order to--and be 
transferred rather than quitting, so that I could 
retain all my benefits. 
Q. What did Jay say to you in that regard, if 
anything? 
A. He says, "well, if it's going to mean the 
difference between your having your benefits or 
not, maybe you'd better wait a couple of days and 
be transferred. 
Q. You said he indicated he was going to check 
on something for you? 
A. Right. 
Q. What was he going to check on? 
A. When we was discussing about the benefits and 
things a little bit after that, he said he didn't 
know about it, but he'd check on it about the 
benefits and things. 
Q. Did he ever have another conversation with 
you about benefits or about insurance? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever ask him? 
A. No, I don't believe I did. 
Q. During this whole period of time you've had 
in your possession a copy of the red book? 
A. Uh huh. 
-10-
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In reviewing the plaintiff's deposition, it becomes 
clear that the highest level of authority that anybody could 
rise to who spoke to him would either be the supervisor over the 
line drivers, who was Floyd Rowley, or a supervisor out in the 
shop named Jay Williams. The one was rather confused about what 
he told him and he talked about benefits in general, there being 
included within the "red book" numerous benefits in general, not 
just those relating to insurance. The other supervisor, that 
being Jay Williams, told him that he would, in effect, check the 
matter out and get back to him, which he (Williams) did not do. 
Thereafter, the plaintiff never checked again with anybody about 
benefits or about insurance. During the whole of that period of 
time, he had in his possession a copy of the "red book," des-
cribing the benefits, and he admitted that he had read it on 
more than one occasion and was familiar with those requirements. 
It might be further noted that these two supervisors 
could not bind the corporation under any circumstance. First, 
these were not officers or agents of the corporation. Second, 
they had no authority to bind the corporation in any way what-
soever. In Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporation, Volume 2, Chapter 
11, Section 733, it is stated as follows: 
Declarations or admissions of an officer or agent 
of a corporation are not binding upon it, nor 
admissible in evidence against it for any pur-
pose, unless they were made by the officer or 
agent in the course of a transaction on behalf of 
the corporation, and within the scope of his 
authority, or unless they were expressly autho-
rized by the corporation, or have since been 
ratified by it. 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is no claim that anyone Mr. Larson spoke with 
rises to the authority of an officer or agent, nor is there any 
indication or claim that the people with whom Mr. Larson spoke 
had authority to bind the corporation in relation to the 
coverage of benefits. 
page 600: 
As found in 19 Am. Jur.2d, Corporations, Section 1174, 
Owing to the enormous scope of the business of 
the present-day corporations, their business is 
frequently divided into departments, and managers 
or superintendents of the departments are 
appointed. The manager or superintendent of a 
department stands in the same relation to his 
department as does the general manager or 
superintendent to the general affairs of the 
corporation, and the corporation is liable for 
his accounts within the apparent scope of his 
authority. 
Neither of the people that Mr. Larson spoke to stood ir 
the position of running the insurance department or of the other 
employee benefit areas. As a matter of fact, as noted in the 
quote from Mr. Larson's deposition, as found on page 15, at 
lines 11 through 14, Jay Williams agreed to check out what Mr. 
Rowley said to the plaintiff about his ability to continue with 
his benefits. But, as also noted, he never responded to the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff did nothing further to check upon 
the matter. Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the 
two supervisors had no authority to bind Wycoff Company or 
Galbraith & Green, Inc. 
-12-
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POINT III 
THE FACT THAT PAYMENTS WERE MADE BY MISTAKE WHEN 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR RECEIVING 
BENEFITS DOES NOT BIND WYCOFF COMPANY TO ANY 
FURTHER PAYMENTS. 
Wycoff paid, through a mistake by its administrator, 
Galbraith & Green, Inc., approximately $1,200.00 in medical 
bills, which it was not obligated to pay after the plaintiff 
became a noneligible employee. As noted above, Wycoff Company 
elects not to sue to recover these amounts, but it could. As is 
said in Volume 18, Couch on Insurance 2d, Section 74:189, "Right 
of Insurer to Recover Payments": 
As a general rule, if the insurer pays a loss, 
being induced so to do by fraud, or by mistake as 
to facts which, if it had had knowledge thereof, 
would have been a sufficient defense in an action 
by the insured upon the policy, the money so paid 
may be recovered. (Citing numerous cases.} 
Under the circumstances contained herein, where the 
plaintiff was a nonelgible employee, there is no doubt about the 
fact that payment was made under a mistake of fact. If the 
insurer, in this case Wycoff Company through Galbraith & Green, 
Inc., could recover payments made by mistake, a fortiori, it 
could refuse to make any further payments to a noneligible 
employee. 
-13-
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POINT IV 
WYCOFF COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM MADE 
UNDER THE LAFAYETTE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY POLICY. 
The policy of insurace sued upon by the plaintiff runs 
from Lafayette Life Insurance Company to the plaintiff. While 
Wycoff Company paid the premium, it had no other connection witl 
the policy, other than being the employer of the group that was 
insured and obligated to make the premium payment for each of 
the qualified employees, which it did. 
Appellant's argument that the statutory provisions of 
31-20-11, U.C.A. (Supp. 1979) relating to conversion privilege 
is not appropriate for two reasons. First, the health and 
accident coverage (a self insured program) administered by 
Galbraith & Green, Inc., is not convertible upon termination. 
Second, the statutory law is not retroactive and there is no 
common law which would give appellant the relief he seeks. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the deposition of the plaintiff 
himself that he became a noneligible employee and, thus, no 
longer was entitled to coverage under either the health and 
accident or the life insurance policies. The plaintiff 
admittedly knew of the requirement that he be a full-time 
employee, as he first worked for Wycoff Company as a part-time 
employee and was not then eligible for the benefits, a fact 
-14-
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which he admitted. Later, he became a full-time employee, 
applied for and received employee benefits, and had full 
knowledge of the requirements, as set forth in the "red book." 
The plaintiff has been paid all of the benefits to which he was 
entitled and, in fact, has been overpaid. Under the circum-
stances, summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against 
the plaintiff must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BRO & DUNN 
Jamy;·/ • Br 
Att r eys for Defendant, Galbraith 
& Green, Inc. 
MOFFAT, WELLING & PAULSEN 
D H. MOFFAT 
Attorneys for Def en 
Company, Inc. 
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